The Tonghak Rebellion
Unrest Among the Peasantry
Despite the critical international situation Choson now faced, the government lacked any coherent policy. This government of King Kojong and the Min family oligarchs could only think to maintain itself in power hy seeking the backing of foreign states, not by winning the support of the Korean people. Meanwhile the nation's chronic financial crisis had further worsened. On the one hand special exemptions, abandoned fields, and tax evasion had diminished the government's receipts, while at the same time developments subsequent to the opening of Korean ports-the exchange of diplomatic missions, the payment of indemnities to Japan, and the inIroduction of modern facilities-required new and heavy expenditures. These needs in part were met from customs receipts and from foreign loans, hut government activities still had to be financed preponderantly by the farming villages. The burdens on the peasantry thus doubled or even tripled, liS every pretext was used to impose fresh levies and the petty functionaries who collected them resorted to ever more harsh methods of extortion. Under these circumstances the grievances harbored by the peasants toward their yangban rulers gave every indication of erupting into violence. Indeed, popular uprisings were breaking out in many areas, while armed bandits were raiding periodic markets and other centers of goods distribution with alarming frequency.
At the same time, Japanese economic penetration was further eroding Korea's village economy. Although Japan had been the first to take aggressive advantage of Korea, Japan's position in the peninsula inevitably
deteriorated because of its involvement in the failed 1884 coup. Nevertheless,
by the early 1890's Japanese economic activity had reached astonishing
proportions that no other nation could rival. The establishments of Jap
anese merchants were to be found on a large scale in each of the open
ports, Inch'on, Pusan, and Wonsan, and statistics for 1896 show that 210 of
258 such businesses were Japanese. Japan also enjoyed a heavy preponderance
with respect to numbers of merchant vessels entering Korean ports. Among
1,322 merchant ships with a gross tonnage of 387,507 entering Korea's
ports in 1893, 956 weighing 304,224 tons were Japanese; in percentage
terms 72 ~~ of the vessels and over 78 % of the gross tonnage came in under
the Japanese flag. Accordingly, Japan's proportion of the total volume of
Korea's foreign trade loomed correspondingly large: over 90% of exports
went to Japan and more than 50% of imports came from Japan. A full
breakdown is shown in the following table.
KOREA'S FOREIGN TRADE BY COUNTRY IN 1893 Unit: yen
COUNTRY EXPORTS (%) IMPORTS (%)
China 134,085 ( 7.9) 1,905,698 ( 49.1)
Japan 1,543,114 ( 90.9) 1,949,043 ( 50.2)
Russia 20,917 ( 1.2) 25,414 ( 0.7)
TOTAL: 1,698,116 (100.0) 3,880,155 (100.0)
The principal import item, cotton cloth, came in both from China and
Japan, but whereas Chinese merchants simply were reexporting English
cotton goods, Japanese traders increasingly brought in cloth manufactured
in their own country. Korean exports, chief among which were rice, soy
beans, gold, and cowhides, went almost entirely to Japan. It must be noted,
too, that Japanese traders mostly were from the lawless or depressed ele
ments of Japan's society, and they showed no scruples in their eagerness to
make their fortunes at the expense of the Korean peasant. Shrewdly taking
advantage of the fact that the village people could only buy Japanese cotton
goods, kettles, pots and pans, farming tools, kerosene, dyestuffs, salt, and
other things by selling their rice, Japanese traders would loan their victims the money with which to make purchases and then at harvest time claim a part or even all of the peasant's crop. Living as they were in such straitened
circumstances, the Korean peasants could not resist the glitter of the Jap
anese goods, only to find themselves made destitute by the exorbitant in
terest extorted by the profit-hungry Japanese.
One way the government found to resist Japan's economic penetration
was to prohibit the export of rice from certain provinces. Such bans were
put into effect for Hamgyong province in 1889 and for Hwanghae in 1890,
but Japanese protests rendered them ineffective. Due to a combination of
factors, then, the villages continued to sink into destitution, while the
3. The Revolutionary Uprising of the Tonghak Peasant Army
28.1
peasantry harbored a mounting hostility toward its exploiters, Korean and foreign alike.
Uprising of the Tonghak Peasant Army
After the execution in 1864 of its founder Ch'oe Che-u, the Tonghak ("Eastern Learning") movement for a time could not operate in the open. But under its second Patriarch, Ch'oe Si-hyong (1829-1898), despite great difficulties the Bible of Tonghak Doctrine (Tonggyongtaejon) and Hymnsfrom Dragon Pool (Yongdam yusa) were compiled, thus systematizing the tenets of the new religion. At the same time a network of churches was successfully established, organizing members into "parishes" (p'o) and creating a hierarchy of church leadership. This movement to bring new converts lmder Tonghak discipline owed its success to the peasantry's deep hostility toward the yangban class and its resistance to the inroads of foreign powers.
As the Tonghak grew to become a force in Korean society, its energies were channeled into a movement to clear the name of the founder of the false charges under which he had been sentenced to death. This effort took overt form first in 1892, when several thousand Tonghak members gathered lit Samnye in Cholla province and made demands on the lIovernors of Cholla and Ch'ungch'ong that Ch'oe Che-u be posthumously exonerated and that suppression of the Tonghak be ended. The former demand was rejected on the ground that the governors lacked authority to take such action, but a pledge was given that local functionaries would hl' ordered to stop their persecution of Tonghak believers. Not satisfied with this, the assembled Tonghak followers resolved to carry their strug~Ic to Seoul, to try to achieve their objective by petitioning the throne directly from in front of the palace gates. They carried out this resolve the following year, and when this form of protest also met with rejection, the petitioners in fact being dispersed by force, the order was given for Tonghak members to assemble again, this time at Poon in Ch'ungch'ong province. More than 20,000 heeded the summons to Poon, where they pro('l~cded to erect defensive barricades, hoist banners, and call for a "cruMllde to expel the Japanese and Westerners." The disconcerted authorities harely succeeded in dispersing the Tonghak throngs by threatening the use of force, while at the same time soothing them with further promises to punish the functionaries who had persecuted the Tonghak most harshly.
rhus the growing strength of the Tonghak made continued prohibition of I he faith futile, and this in turn led to still further expansion of the movement's appeal.
In 1894 the now expanded, well organized Tonghak movement erupted Illto a revolutionary peasant struggle employing military operations on II "u'ge scale. The magistrate of Kobu county, Cho Pyong-gap, was known
1m his tyrannical cruelty, and since assuming his post he had taken every opportunity to inflict torment on the hard-pressed people he governed.
He illegally extorted large amounts from tht, peasantry, for example collecting over 1000 yang (equivalent perhaps to 1500 contemporary U.S. silver dollars) to erect a covering structure over his father's tombstone. But what most evoked their bitter protests was the tax he enforced on irrigation water from the Mansokpo reservoir. He had mobilized the peasants to labor on a new reservoir constructed on a site just below the old one, and yet he now extorted more than 700 sok of rice in water use charges from the very peasants whose sweat and toil had built the reservoir. The enraged people of Kobu had repeatedly petitioned for redress of their griev
ances, but to no effect. At this point, under the leadership of the head of Kobu county's Tonghak parish, Chon Pong-jun, the peasants occupied the county office, seized weapons, distributed the illegally collected tax rice to the poor, and then destroyed the Mansokpo reservoir. When a report of the incident reached the government, a specially empowered inspector was dispatched to investigate. This official, however, charged the Tonghak with responsibility for the uprising and, drawing up a roster of Tonghak members, arrested some and summarily executed others, meanwhile committing the further outrage of burning Tonghak homes. Further inflamed by this cruel denial of simple justice, the peasants rallied around ChOn Pongjun, Kim Kae-nam, Son Hwa-jung, and other Tonghak members and rose again. A call to arms now went out to the peasants, appealing to them to rise in defense of the nation and to secure the livelihood of its people. The peroration of this proclamation read as follows:
The people are the root of the nation. If the root withers, the nation will be enfeebled. Heedless of their responsibility for sustaining the state and providing for its people, the officials build lavish residences in the countryside, scheming to ensure their own well-being at the expense of the resources of the nation. How can this be viewed as proper? We are wretched village people far from the capital, yet we feed and clothe ourselves with the bounty from the sovereign's land. We cannot sit by and watch our nation perish. The whole nation is as one, its multitudes united in their determination to raise the righteous standard of revolt, and to pledge their lives to sustain the state and provide for the livelihood of the people. However startling the action we take today may seem, you must not be troubled by it. For as we felicitously live out the tranquil years ahead, each man secure in his occupation - when all the people can enjoy the blessings of benevolent kingly rule, how immeasurably joyful will we be!
Now peasants from all the surrounding areas came to join forces with the Tonghak army, swelling its ranks to some several thousands. They wrapped multicolored cloth around their heads and waists, and for weapons they had a few rifles or swords or lances they had seized, but otherwise they mostly had only bamboo spears and cudgels. Nevertheless, holding aloft their distinctive yellow flags and protected from bullets, they believed, by the amulets they wore, the Tonghak peasant soldiers were fairly spoiling for a fight, After occupying Kobu they moved their base
Massed now in battle formation, the Tonghak peasant army first crushed the government troops sent from Chonju at Hwangt'ohyon hill in Kobu Ihen in turn seized Chongiip, Koch'ang, and Mujang, and still advanced southward took control of Yonggwang and Hamp'yong Their ranks meanwhile had increased to over 10,000 men. The government in Seoul already had dispatched Hong Kye-hun to suppress them, in command of an elite battalion of about 800 men from the Seoul garrison. By the time he reached Chonju, however, his force had been cut in half by desertions, and so despite its superiority in weapons and timely arrival of reinforcements, there was no way it could defeat the confident, spirited Tonghak soldiery. Routing Hong Kye-hun's troops at Changsong, the Tonghak army pushed north against virtually no resistance and occupied Chonju.
In a state of panic, the government hastily appealed to China for military support. China's response was immediate, and within a month a sizeable force had landed at Asan Bay. Japan, however, also sent in troops, and thee two powers faced each other in an increasingly tense confrontation. Convinced now that the Tonghak must be appeased by whatever means and its army of peasants dispersed, the government proposed that il Iruee be negotiated. Informed of the government's willingness to listen 10 ronghak demands, Chon Pong-jun regarded this as an opportunity to "dlieve his objectives without further recourse to warfare. In consequence hostilities came to an end, on condition that an end also be put to government misrule. The Tonghak demands in this regard were the same as when they took up their arms: first that the yangban be prevented from draining the ' life-blood of the peasants by their illegal extortions; and secondly, I II lit the government block the inroads of foreign merchants.
A t this point the Tonghak peasant soldiers withdrew from Chonju and returned to their homes, while a separate Tonghak force that had arisen ('h'ungch'ong province also dispersed. But with the announced aim of establishing congregations in every village, the Tonghak extended their organized network into area after area. In the fifty-three counties of Cholla province in particular, so-called Local Directorates (Chipkangso) were established blished and set about reforming local government abuses. These popular organs, headed by a director and staffed by clerks, existed in parallel with the formal county administration, and in the provincial capital at Chonju Headquarters Directorate (Taedoso) was established with Chon Pong-jun "' its helm. On the whole the positions in the Local Directorates went to those with knowledge of administrative matters . The proposed reform program was as follows :
I. Eliminate the chronic mistrust between Tonghak believers and the government and cooperate in dealing with problems of administration.
2. Investigate the crimes of venal and corrupt officials and punish theguilty severely.
3. Sternly punish men of wealth who owe their fortunes to high-handed extortionate practices.
4. Discipline those yangban in or out of office whose conduct is improper. S. Burn all documents pertaining to slaves.
6. Rectify the treatment of those engaged in the "seven despised occupations"
(lackeys attached to government offices and laborers assigned to perform certain arduous services for the state) and free the paekchjinng outcasts once and for all from the wearing of their distinctive "P'yongyang hat."
7. Permit the remarriage of young widows.
8. Ban collection of all arbitrary and irregular taxes.
9. In employing officials, break the pattern of regional and class discrimination and appoint men of talent.
10. Severely punish those who collaborate with the Japanese.
11. Cancel all outstanding debts, whether owed to government agencies or to
private individuals.
12. Distribute land equally for cultivation by owner-farmers.
The principal concerns expressed here are, in sum, that the oppressive treatment of the Tonghak by the government and the yangban be stopped, Ihll' nn end be put to excessive economic exploitation of the peasantry, that discriminatory treatment based on social class status be abolished, that that those guilty of collusion with the Japanese in their aggressive designs be punished. This revolutionary program to be implemented through the Local Directorates was welcomed with the greatest enthusiasm hy the peasantry. Thus the powerful appeal of the Tonghak movement Willi felt not only in Cholla but spread into the other southern provinces as well, and even far northward into P'yongang and Hamgyong.
Japanese troops firing on Tonghaks
The pause in the fighting, however, had worked to the disadvantage of the Tonghak peasant army, for the explosive situation created by the presence of both Chinese and Japanese troops in Korea soon led to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (in late July, 1894) and Japan's exercise of virtual control over all internal security matters in Korea. Later in the year, in October, the Tonghak again took up their arms and began to move northward, with the avowed intent of expelling the Japanese. But they were defeated in fighting at Kongju against government troops reinforced by a
.Japanese army contingent, and they met defeat again at T'aein. Many of the leaders of the peasant army, including Chon Pong-jun, were captured and killed and before long the Tonghak army had been scattered.
China and Japan Compete for Ascendancy
Unable to suppress the struggle of the Tonghak peasant army with its own forces, the Korean government had requested assistance from Ch'ing China. Perceiving this to be an opportune occasion to solidify its deteriorating position in Korea, China dispatched a force of 3000 men under Yeh Chih-ch'ao to land at Asan Bay. This action was reported to the Japanese government, in accordance with the terms of the Convention of Tientsin.
No less than China, Japan too now saw an opportunity to expand its influence in Korea. Japan not only hoped to restore its position of political primacy but also was keenly aware of the need to ensure a Korean market
Accordingly, under pretext of protecting its citizens resident in Korea,
.Japan landed a large force of 7000 troops at Inch'on, backed by seven
warrships. By this time, however, the Tonghak peasant army already had
withdrawn from Chonju, so that the ostensible reason for stationing
Chinese and Japanese troops in Korea no longer existed. Recognizing this, China proposed a joint withdrawal to Japan, and this proposal was support
ed both by the Korean government and by the foreign powers. However,
dutermined to take advantage of the situation to completely eliminate
Chinese power in Korea, Japan rejected the Chinese plan. In turn, then,
Japan suggested that the two powers jointly undertake to reform Korea's
internal administration. For the record, Japan argued that reform was
absolutely essential if internal unrest were not again to flare into open rebellion, and that peace in East Asia depended on preventing such an
occurrence. This was merely a pretext, however, and in fact Japan's pur
pose was to raise an issue unacceptable to China and then seize upon it
as an excuse to open hostilities. China of course rejected the proposal as
constituting interference in the internal affairs of another nation, where
upon the talks became deadlocked and a clash between China and Japan
became inevitable.
The Sino-Japanese War began with a preemptive attack by Japanese war
ships at Asan Bay in July, 1894, and it ended in a Japanese victory early
in 1895. In the ensuing Treaty of Shimonoseki concluded between the two
powers, China's acknowledgment of the full independence of Korea was
detailed in the very first article. the modern weapons and training of the Japanese troops. In the end, then, struggle as they might against the yangban power structure within and the aggressive forces of foreign imperialism from abroad, the Tonghak peasant soldiers were caught in a vise between the two and were crushed.